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Assessing the Impact of the Ancillary
Powers Doctrine on Three Decades
of Charter Jurisprudence
Vanessa MacDonnell*
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been said that one of the paradoxes of the entrenchment of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is that it has led to the
expansion of police powers.1 While both Parliament and the courts have
contributed to this expansion, Parliament’s involvement has been largely
confined to the search and seizure context.2 Following a string of early
post-Charter decisions in which the Supreme Court concluded that the
police’s actions infringed the section 8 rights of the accused, Parliament
amended the Criminal Code3 to amplify the search powers of police.4
The courts, meanwhile, have used the ancillary powers doctrine to carve
out expanded powers for the police. Thus, alongside Charter cases that
delineate the rights of the accused and the limits of state power can be
found cases in which the ancillary powers doctrine has been successfully
*
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa (Common Law Section).
Thank you to Leo Russomanno and Jula Hughes for helpful conversations about this paper, to the
anonymous reviewers for their very useful comments, and to Julia Finniemore and Colin Heighton
for their research assistance. Thank you also to members of the Faculty of Law, University of
Ottawa (Common Law Section) for useful comments made in the context of a related paper that also
greatly assisted in framing this piece. This paper builds upon James Stribopoulos’ considerable body
of scholarship on common law police powers in Canada.
1
See James Stribopoulos, “Has the Charter Been for Crime Control? Reflecting on 25
Years of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in Canada” in Margaret E. Beare, ed., Honouring Social
Justice: Honouring Dianne Martin (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) 351, at 359
[hereinafter “Stribopoulos, ‘Crime Control’”]. Technically speaking, the powers of the police have
not actually been expanded, since the idea is that the power existed all along but had simply not been
articulated until that moment. Following Stribopoulos, however, I will refer to the ancillary powers
cases as creating “new” police powers. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter
“Charter”].
2
James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the
Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1 [hereinafter “Stribopoulos, ‘In Search of Dialogue’”].
3
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
4
Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 2, at 64-67.
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invoked to uphold the actions of police against claims of unauthorized
police conduct.5 In the latter cases, the courts have dismissed the accused’s Charter claim after recognizing a new common law police power
authorizing the officer’s actions ex post.
James Stribopoulos has been critical of the role that courts have
played in the expansion of police powers since 1982.6 In his view,
judicial elaboration of police powers is a departure from the Supreme
Court’s “historic role of standing firm between the individual and the
state, and refusing to make up for shortcomings in police powers”.7
Stribopoulos argues that it is simply not the Court’s role in adjudicating
cases under the Charter to ensure that the police are equipped with the
powers they need to investigate crime. He suggests that Parliament is
better suited to the task of balancing the “competing goals and purposes”
inherent in defining the scope of the police’s authority, particularly since
those powers have an impact upon individual rights.8
In this paper I explore the factors that may have led the Supreme
Court to assume a role in articulating new police powers since 1982. I
also attempt to situate the ancillary powers cases within the context of a
larger jurisprudential trend of balancing individual rights and “societal
interests”9 outside of section 1 that has emerged in the Charter case law.10
I will suggest that courts may be disposed to create new common law
police powers because in some cases, the police have infringed the
Charter rights of a suspect in a manner that the court concludes is
reasonable or justifiable, but the constitutional machinery upon which it
normally relies to give effect to such arguments — that is, section 1 — is
functionally unavailable.11 Since the police are not typically authorized
to violate Charter rights in carrying out their duties, their actions will
rarely satisfy section 1’s prescribed by law requirement.12 Precluded
from justifying the rights violation under section 1, the only remaining
question is whether any evidence gathered should be excluded pursuant
5

Id.
Id., at 54-55.
7
Id., at 55.
8
Id., at 55-56.
9
The term “societal interests” has been used throughout the Supreme Court case law. For
an example in the police powers context, see, e.g., R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R.
59, at para. 15 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mann”]. I will use this term throughout.
10
See Vanessa MacDonnell, “Interrogating the Supreme Court’s decision in R v Sinclair”
38 Queen’s L.J. (forthcoming in 2012) [hereinafter “MacDonnell, ‘Sinclair’”].
11
Id.
12
Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
2010), at 27 [hereinafter “Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law”].
6
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to section 24(2) of the Charter. In practice, this means that the court is
unable to consider arguments that go to justification, such as the argument that society has an “interest in effective policing”13 or that the
conduct is otherwise proportional, unless the court identifies a common
law source of authority for the police’s actions and/or considers such
arguments at some other stage of the analysis.
Both the jurisprudence and the academic commentary suggest that
the way that courts conceive of and approach their role in Charter cases
is influenced significantly by the “two-stage”, infringement-justification
structure of Charter analysis.14 The presence of section 1 means that
courts are free to interpret rights robustly at the first stage of the analysis;15 it is only if a Charter violation is established that the court moves
on to consider whether the limitation on Charter rights can be justified.16
The two-stage mode of analysis thus preserves the integrity of the
Charter’s individual rights guarantees while also making it possible for
the government to limit those rights in cases where it can proffer sufficient justification.17
It is of more than trifling significance, then, that the two-stage mode
of Charter analysis is not a feature of most criminal procedure cases.18 As
I have noted, the section 1 inquiry is greatly truncated in most legal
rights cases because of the impossibility of satisfying the prescribed by
law requirement. For this reason, it is not surprising that courts have
searched for ways of giving effect to justification-type arguments outside
of section 1. In this paper I argue that, whether intentionally or not, the
functional unavailability of section 1 in police powers cases has led the
courts to elaborate a doctrine of ancillary powers that is virtually indistinguishable from the justification analysis prescribed in R. v. Oakes.19
13

Mann, supra, note 9, at para. 15. I will use this language throughout.
See R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”];
Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section One of the Charter” (1988)
10 S.C.L.R. 469, at 472 [hereinafter “Weinrib, ‘Section One’”]. I will use this terminology
throughout.
15
See R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.).
16
Notable exceptions include the jurisprudence under ss. 7 and 10(b) and 11(b) of the Charter: see MacDonnell, “Sinclair”, supra, note 10.
17
R. v. Swain, [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, at 977 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Swain”].
18
There are two circumstances where this is not the case. The first is where Parliament or a
provincial legislature has enacted a statutory framework to govern the police’s exercise of authority.
There are few such examples outside the s. 8 context, where Parliament has created a statutory
scheme to govern search and seizure. The second involves the ancillary powers cases, which I
discuss in this paper.
19
Supra, note 14.
14
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Rather than concluding that the police’s unauthorized conduct violated
the accused’s Charter rights but that the infringement is justified under
section 1 (something the Court is unable to do for the reasons identified
above), the Court instead concludes that the police’s actions can be
justified under the ancillary powers doctrine. By curing the deficiency
which previously raised a credible Charter issue — that is, the lack of
authority to detain or search — the Charter analysis is effectively preempted.20 At the very least, the section 1 justification mechanism becomes
available, the prescribed by law issue having been resolved by recognizing a new source of police power grounded in the common law.21
I begin this paper by attempting to substantiate the claim that the
functional unavailability of the section 1 analysis in most police powers
cases has led the Supreme Court to develop a doctrine of ancillary
powers that mirrors the Oakes test. I then discuss the concerns that arise
from this “end run”22 around the Charter. The first is that the ancillary
powers doctrine precludes the courts from engaging in an assessment of
the Charter compliance of police conduct that may give rise to a credible
Charter claim. Instead, the focus of the analysis is on whether a new
police power should be recognized. While the courts do not ignore the
Charter in the context of this inquiry, its role is nonetheless diminished,
resulting in a legal analysis that underemphasizes the constitutional
status of the accused’s legal rights.23 Second, the ancillary powers
doctrine empowers courts to mete out additional law enforcement
powers, a function that is more legislative than judicial.24 The better
approach, as Stribopoulos suggests, is to leave the expansion of police
powers to Parliament.25 I conclude by briefly discussing possible
criticisms that might be raised in response to the theory outlined in this
paper and by addressing the relevance of section 24(2) to my analysis.

20
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725, at para. 79 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Clayton”], per Binnie J.
21
If a common law police power has been recognized but the police exceed that power, the
deprivation of rights is similarly not prescribed by law.
22
Clayton, supra, note 20, at para. 79. I will use this term throughout.
23
Id., at para. 78, per Binnie J.
24
Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 2.
25
Id.; James Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment? Investigative Detention: Ten Years Later”
(2003) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 335, at 380-81, 390-92.
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II. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE ANCILLARY
POWERS TEST AND R. V. OAKES
In the past three decades, the Supreme Court of Canada has developed a doctrine of ancillary powers that is virtually indistinguishable
from the justification analysis prescribed by Oakes. The strongest
support for this claim can be found in the ancillary powers cases themselves. Beginning in the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Dedman26 and
continuing through Cloutier v. Langlois,27 R. v. Mann,28 R. v. Clayton,29
R. v. M. (A.)30 and R. v. Kang-Brown,31 the Supreme Court “refined and
incrementally applied the Waterfield [ancillary powers] test”32 until it
closely resembled the Oakes test in both form and function.
Dedman was the first ancillary powers case to be heard by the Supreme Court. There, a majority of the Court adopted the common law
police powers test established by the British Court of Appeals two
decades earlier in R. v. Waterfield, that is, “whether (a) such conduct falls
within the general scope of any duty imposed by statute or recognised at
common law and (b) whether such conduct, albeit within the general
scope of such a duty, involved an unjustifiable use of powers associated
with the duty.”33 As under section 1, the focus of the Waterfield test was
on whether the exercise of police power was justified in the circumstances. Although the inquiry into justification did not take place against
the backdrop of an infringement of constitutional rights (Waterfield was
not a Charter case), it was clear that whatever powers were conferred on
the police subtracted from the liberty of individual citizens.34 This gave
rise to a requirement of justification.
Justice Le Dain, writing for the majority, qualified the nature of the
liberty at stake in Dedman. He noted that

26

[1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dedman”].
[1990] S.C.J. No. 10, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.).
28
Supra, note 9.
29
Supra, note 20.
30
[2008] S.C.J. No. 19, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “M. (A.)”].
31
[2008] S.C.J. No. 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kang-Brown”].
32
Mann, supra, note 9, at para. 25.
33
R. v. Waterfield; R. v. Lynn, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, at 661 (C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Waterfield”], cited in Dedman, supra, note 26, at para. 20.
34
See Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 2, at 8, citing T.R.S. Allan, “Constitutional Rights and Common Law” (1991) 11 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 453, at 457. See generally
Kent Roach, “Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme Court and
Canadian Legislatures” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 481.
27
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In applying the Waterfield test to the random stop of a motor vehicle
for the purpose contemplated by the R.I.D.E. program, it is convenient
to refer to the right to circulate in a motor vehicle on the public
highway as a “liberty” ... In assessing the interference with this right by
a random vehicle stop, one must bear in mind, however, that the right is
not a fundamental liberty like the ordinary right of movement of the
individual, but a licensed activity that is subject to regulation and
control for the protection of life and property.35

In the cases that followed Dedman, the individual liberty interest at stake
was often significantly weightier. In R. v. Golden,36 for example, the
Court was asked to decide whether the common law authorized the
police to perform a strip search of a suspect incident to arrest. Even
where this lesser liberty interest was concerned, however, the Court in
Dedman concluded that the exercise of police powers must be both
necessary and reasonable to survive the justification inquiry.37 The
R.I.D.E. program challenged in Dedman met these requirements because
it was necessary to ensure the safety of other motorists and reasonable
“having regard to the nature of the liberty interfered with and the importance of the public purpose served by the interference”.38 One can see in
this analysis traces of the Oakes test, including requirements of a pressing
and substantial objective, minimal impairment and proportionality.
In the subsequent case of Cloutier v. Langois,39 the Supreme Court
was asked to determine whether the police had a common law power to
search a suspect incident to arrest. Cloutier v. Langois is revealing
because here the full extent of the similarity between the ancillary
powers doctrine and Oakes emerges. The Court explained that the
common law authorized the police to search a suspect incident to arrest
where the search “m[et] the underlying objectives” of the common law
power, was conducted “for a valid objective in pursuit of the ends of
criminal justice, such as the discovery of an object that may be a threat to
the safety of the police, the accused or the public, or that may facilitate
escape or act as evidence against the accused”, and was not performed
“in an abusive fashion”.40 The “frisk” at issue in Cloutier v. Langois fell
within these parameters, the Court explained, because “a brief search
35

Dedman, supra, note 26, at para. 68.
[2001] S.C.J. No. 81, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Golden”].
Dedman, supra, note 26, at para. 69.
38
Id.
39
Supra, note 27.
40
Id., at 187 S.C.R., paras. 61, 62. See also Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal
Law, supra, note 12, at 252.
36
37
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does not constitute, in view of the objectives sought, a disproportionate
interference with the freedom of persons lawfully arrested,” nor were
there “less intrusive means of attaining these objectives”.41
The parallels between this analysis and Oakes are obvious. The
Court began by identifying a rights infringement (in common law terms,
a deprivation of “liberty”42) caused by the exercise of police power. It
then asked whether the infringement furthered a pressing and substantive
objective (the “effective control of criminal acts”43 by police), whether
there was a rational connection between the exercise of the power and
the objective sought to be achieved (“necessary in order for the peace
officers to perform their duty”44), whether the measure was minimally
impairing (are there “less intrusive means of attaining these objectives”?45) and proportional (“reasonable in light of the public purposes
served ... on the one hand and on the other respect for the liberty and
fundamental dignity of individuals”46).
The stages of the Waterfield test thus mirror the Oakes analysis with
startling precision. The Court’s broader framing of the ancillary powers
doctrine also mimics the section 1 inquiry, insofar as the Court has
acknowledged that police powers cases permit the courts to “balance”
society’s interest in effective law enforcement and individual rights. In
Mann, for example, the majority’s reasons for judgment began by noting
that the appeal “offer[ed] another opportunity to consider the delicate
balance that must be struck in adequately protecting individual liberties
and properly recognizing legitimate police functions.”47
In the more recent police powers cases, some members of the Court
have acknowledged the functional similarity between the ancillary
powers doctrine and section 1. The justices who have drawn this link are
critical of the expansion of police powers that has occurred under the
doctrine. In Clayton, for example, the majority applied the ancillary
powers doctrine to conclude that the police were justified in setting up a
roadblock at the exits of a strip club after receiving a call that several
males were brandishing handguns in the parking lot of the club. The
majority noted that the police had reasonable grounds to detain vehicles
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Cloutier v. Langlois, supra, note 27, at 186 S.C.R., para. 58.
Id., at 183. See also Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 2, at 2.
Cloutier v. Langois, supra, note 27, at 181 S.C.R., para. 50.
Id.
Id., at 186 S.C.R., para. 58.
Id., at 181-82 S.C.R., para. 50.
Mann, supra, note 9, at para. 1.
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as they were leaving the parking lot because the alleged offence was
grave and posed a threat to the broader public, and the scope of the
roadblock was limited in its duration and geographic scope.48 The
majority also found that the subsequent search incident to investigative
detention was justified in the circumstances.
In concurring reasons, Binnie J., writing for three members of the
Court, chastised the majority for doing an “end run” around the Charter.49
He argued that the Waterfield test and section 1 were not and should not
be “duplicative of one another”.50 Crafting a common law test for police
powers that rendered the Charter analysis redundant moved the analysis
out of the constitutional framework and into the much more discretionary
realm of the common law. There, Binnie J. pointed out, the Charter rights
of the accused had no logical priority over other interests.51 The majority
responded that the ancillary powers doctrine did not effect an “end run”52
around the Charter because “Charter values” informed the articulation of
the police’s common law powers.53
I will address the substance of the criticisms raised by the concurring
justices in Clayton in the following section. For the moment, it is
sufficient to note that while the justices seem divided on the question of
whether the similarities between the Oakes test and the ancillary powers
doctrine are problematic, the existence of these similarities is not lost on
the Court. Not only do these similarities emerge through a careful
parsing of the cases, therefore, but they have also been acknowledged by
the Court in the more recent ancillary powers cases.

III. THE CHARTER AS INTERPRETATIVE TOOL
AND OTHER CONCERNS
Against the backdrop of the functional unavailability of section 1 in
police powers cases, the Court appears to have reconstructed the Oakes
analysis at the stage of determining whether the police were authorized

48

Clayton, supra, note 20, at paras. 33-41.
Id., at para. 79, per Binnie J.
50
Id., at para. 78, per Binnie J.
51
Id. For a related critique made in the context of the Supreme Court’s “Charter values”
jurisprudence, see J.A. Manwaring, “Bringing the Common Law to the Bar of Justice: A Comment
on the Decision in the Case of Dolphin Delivery Ltd.” (1987) 19 Ottawa L. Rev. 413.
52
Id., at para. 79, per Binnie J.
53
Id., at para. 21.
49
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by the common law to detain and/or search the accused. In this section I
canvass concerns that are raised by this approach.
The first concern is that the ancillary powers doctrine effects an “end
run” around the Charter.54 To take just one example, recognition of a
power to search incident to arrest in Cloutier v. Langois has significantly
altered the dynamic involved in challenging such searches under the
Charter. In cases involving a search incident to arrest, the inquiry now
begins by asking whether the police had a common law power to search
incident to arrest. If they did not, a section 8 violation is automatically
established. If the police were authorized by the common law to conduct
the search, then two of the three requirements for finding a search
“reasonable” within the meaning of section 8 are satisfied, in that the
search is authorized by the common law and reasonableness of common
law rule will have been established by the Waterfield test.55 In theory, the
section 8 inquiry then shifts to the manner in which the search was
conducted. If the search incident to arrest was carried out in a reasonable
manner, then there is no violation of section 8.56 But the context-specific
nature of the Waterfield test is such that this third question is also bound
up in the determination of whether the police were authorized to act as
they did. In other words, the question for the Court under the ancillary
powers doctrine is “did the police, in the circumstances of this case, act
within the scope of the authority conferred on them by the common
law?” If the answer is yes, then it seems as though all three of the
requirements for a reasonable search have been satisfied. The majority
appears to confirm this in Clayton when it stated, in relation to Charter
challenges under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, that “[if] the police
conduct in detaining and searching Clayton and Farmer amounted to a
lawful exercise of their common law powers, there was no violation of
their Charter rights.”57 In a very real sense, then, the Waterfield test is
54

Id., at para. 79, per Binnie J.
Section 8 of the Charter provides that “everyone has the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.” As the Court in Mann explained, citing the Supreme Court’s earlier
decision in R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Collins”],
“[u]nder Collins, warrantless searches are deemed reasonable if (a) they are authorized by law, (b)
the law itself is reasonable, and (c) the manner in which the search was carried out was also
reasonable”: Mann, supra, note 9, at para. 36. By recognizing a power to search incident to arrest,
the Supreme Court effectively neutralizes the first two of these requirements. Note, however, that a
majority of the Court in Golden, supra, note 36, did consider whether the common law rule
authorizing the police to conduct strip searches incident to arrest for limited purposes was
unreasonable.
56
Collins, id.
57
Clayton, supra, note 20, at para. 19. See also paras. 43-44, 49.
55
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serving in at least some cases as a substitute for both stages of the
Charter analysis.58
On some level, this is desirable. If it were possible to succeed on a
constitutional challenge to a common law police power, it would mean
that the court had promulgated an unconstitutional common law rule,
something that seems to be particularly problematic.59 As LeBel J. stated
in Kang-Brown:
The common law has long been viewed as a law of liberty. Should we
move away from that tradition, which is still part of the ethos of our
legal system and of our democracy? This case is about the freedom of
individuals and the proper function of the courts as guardians of the
Constitution. I doubt that it should lead us to depart from the common
law tradition of freedom by changing the common law itself to restrict
the freedoms protected by the Constitution under s. 8 of the Charter.60

Yet this is exactly what LeBel J., concurring in the reasons of Binnie J. in
Clayton, suggested just a year before penning his judgment in KangBrown.61 After noting that the Constitution, and not the common law,
should be employed to decide the issue before the Court, the three
concurring justices in Clayton proceeded to carve out a common law
police power that they acknowledged was in violation of section 9 of the
Charter.62 The justices then went on to find that the rights violation could
be saved under section 1. A constitutionally compliant common law rule
in hand, Binnie J. then assessed whether the police acted within the scope
of their common law powers in conducting the roadblock, and, finding
that they did, would have allowed the appeal.63
58

See also Mann, supra, note 9.
As a general rule, the Supreme Court has taken the position that if the constitutional
infirmity can be cured through an incremental change to the common law, the courts will adapt the
rule accordingly. If, on the other hand, the changes required to bring the common law into
compliance with the Charter are of such a degree that they could only be accomplished by departing
significantly from the common law mode of incremental development, then the Court must go on to
decide whether the rule should be “saved” under s. 1: see R. v. Salituro, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97, [1991]
3 S.C.R. 654 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Salituro”]; Swain, supra, note 17. While I have difficulties with
this approach, I would note that the considerations are quite different when a new common law rule
is being created. In those circumstances, I would suggest, it is inappropriate for the courts to craft a
new common law rule that is not Charter-compliant.
60
Supra, note 31, at para. 12.
61
See Clayton, supra, note 20, at paras. 58-59.
62
In so doing, Binnie J. noted that this was not unprecedented: see Clayton, id., at para.
105, citing Swain, supra, note 17; R. v. Daviault, [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.);
British Columbia Government Employees’ Union v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1988]
S.C.J. No. 76, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214 (S.C.C.).
63
Clayton, id., at para. 121.
59
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While the nature of common law reasoning might place certain limits
on the Court’s ability to bring existing common law into compliance with
the Charter,64 it is very difficult to see how it could ever be justifiable to
craft new common law rules that are inconsistent with the Charter.
Moreover, creating a common law rule that requires justification under
section 1 inevitably requires the courts to do what the government would
otherwise be required to do — that is, to demonstrate that the interests
served by the newly created common law rule are sufficiently important
to warrant overriding constitutional rights.65 This task places courts in a
very awkward position.66 Thus, whatever the problems raised by the
Court’s ancillary powers jurisprudence, the answer does not lie in the
hybrid approach adopted by the concurring Justices in Clayton.67 Rather,
the most principled course of action is for the courts to analyze these
cases relying solely on the framework provided by the Charter.
So what is the precise nature of the problem created by the “end run”
in these cases? After all, we know that the ancillary powers doctrine
builds in an analogous degree of protection for the individual’s common
law liberty interests and for “Charter values” as section 1. This suggests
that the ancillary powers test developed by the Court protects, or is at
least sensitive to, individual rights. The problem, in brief, is that in these
cases, which typically raise a credible Charter issue, the Charter is
nowhere to be found, other than lurking as a system of values to which
courts might or ought to have resort in resolving the question of the
extent of the police’s powers. In other words, the problem is that the
Court’s mode of analysis engages the Charter in a manner that seems
inconsistent with its status as supreme law.68 One of the main features of
the Charter’s two-stage mode of analysis is that individual rights are the
focal point of the inquiry. Even at the section 1 stage, where the Court is
asked to inquire into whether a deprivation of rights can be justified, the
analysis is oriented so as to recognize the primacy of individual rights.69
Chief Justice Dickson explained the dual character of section 1 in Oakes
as follows:

64

See Salituro, supra, note 59.
Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 2, at 55-56.
Id.
67
On my best reading of the case law, the majority of the Court has never applied this type
of reasoning in the ancillary powers context.
68
See supra, note 51.
69
Weinrib, “Section One”, supra, note 14.
65
66
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It is important to observe ... that s. 1 has two functions: first, it
constitutionally guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in the
provisions which follow; and, second, it states explicitly the exclusive
justificatory criteria (outside of s. 33 of the Constitution Act, 1982)
against which limitations on those rights and freedoms must be
measured. Accordingly, any s. 1 inquiry must be premised on an
understanding that the impugned limit violates constitutional rights and
freedoms — rights and freedoms which are part of the supreme law of
Canada. As Wilson J. stated in Singh v. Minister of Employment and
Immigration, supra, at p. 218: “... it is important to remember that the
courts are conducting this inquiry in light of a commitment to uphold
the rights and freedoms set out in the other sections of the Charter.”70

Yet this rights orientation is conspicuously absent when the police
powers inquiry takes place at the level of the common law. There, the
focus is not on individual rights but on the extent of the police’s powers.
In some sense, then, the ancillary powers doctrine, though incorporating
a form of proportionality analysis, has the inverse of a rights orientation.
Rather than being anchored in a theory of rights as limits on police
powers, the ancillary powers doctrine is anchored in a theory of police
powers as limits on rights.
A related problem that arises from the Supreme Court’s approach in
the ancillary powers cases is that it downgrades the Charter from
constitutional document to mere interpretative tool. In Clayton, the
majority responded to the criticisms of the concurring justices by
explaining that the Charter was not irrelevant to the analysis in ancillary
powers cases. Rather, Charter “values” informed the inquiry into whether
the common law authorized the police to act in the manner they did. The
ancillary powers doctrine, the majority explained:
... is consistent with Charter values because it requires the state to
justify the interference with liberty based on criteria which focus on
whether the interference with liberty is necessary given the extent of
the risk and the liberty at stake, and no more intrusive to liberty than
reasonably necessary to address the risk.71

In other words, the majority seemed to be of the view that the requirements of reasonableness and necessity adequately safeguarded the
Charter “interests” of the accused. On some level, of course, they are
correct. The fact that the ancillary powers test essentially replicates the
70
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analysis under section 1 means that sufficient justification must be
provided to support the expansion of police powers.72 But in characterizing the accused’s rights as Charter “values”, the Court treats the Charter
as a mere interpretative tool in a case involving the unauthorized exercise
of power by a state actor.
A third concern raised by the Supreme Court’s ancillary powers jurisprudence is “institutional”.73 As Stribopoulos explains, the courts have
typically been regarded as defenders of rights rather than amplifiers of
police powers.74 The ancillary powers cases thus raise the question of
whether courts are qualified to carve out new police powers and, assuming they are qualified, whether it is appropriate for them to do so.75
Stribopoulos suggests that courts are not suited to this task for several
reasons. When the courts take the lead in expanding police powers, he
argues, lacunae in police powers “[are] unlikely to make [their] way onto
Parliament’s agenda”76 and a potentially productive “dialogue” between
Parliament and the courts about the appropriate scope of police powers in
a constitutional state is precluded.77 This approach also leaves police
powers to be developed on a case-by-case basis rather than in a wholesale manner by the political branch of government.78 Stribopoulos also
suggests that when courts give new powers to the police, they are overly
optimistic about the degree to which the police will understand the limits
of those powers and deploy them appropriately.79 This is especially
problematic given that police powers carved out by the courts are usually
“open-ended” and therefore susceptible to misuse.80
When Parliament chooses to legislate new police powers, they must
be prepared to advance sufficient justification for any rights infringements that result. When the courts ground new police powers in the
common law, they must supply this justification. In recognizing additional common law police powers, therefore, the courts become partners
in rights limitation.81 This is simply not a position that courts ought to
take, or can take credibly.
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IV. THE CRITICS AND THE ROLE OF SECTION 24(2)
Before concluding, I will respond very briefly to the primary critique
that might be raised in response to the theory I have advanced here. It
might be said that the argument I make in this paper wrongly assumes
that courts ought never to seek to give effect to societal interests, such as
the interest in effective policing that drives the creation of new police
powers, outside of the strict framework of the section 1 analysis. Indeed,
there are many examples of Charter cases in which the courts have given
effect to societal interests at the stage of defining the content of the right
at issue.82 However, this approach has proven controversial.83 The most
coherent accounts of the two-stage mode of Charter analysis insist upon
a conceptual distinction between the two stages.84 As Lamer C.J.C. stated
in his majority reasons in Swain, the concern with considering societal
interests at the first stage of the Charter analysis is that it undermines the
Charter guarantees of the accused.85 In my opinion, this view extends to
the development of new police powers under the ancillary powers
doctrine. I would also suggest that doctrinal clarity and coherent constitutional method requires that societal interests be reserved for the section
1 stage of Charter analysis. When these arguments surface elsewhere, the
integrity of Charter analysis tends to be compromised.
A final word about the role of section 24(2) of the Charter in this
analysis. I have referred throughout this paper to the “two-stage” model
of Charter analysis. In many criminal procedure cases, of course, there is
a “third” stage. If the court concludes that the state has unjustifiably
limited the Charter rights of the accused, the court moves on to the
question of remedy and specifically, to the question of whether any
evidence gathered in breach of the Charter should be excluded. One of
the practical effects of the ancillary powers doctrine is that courts simply
never reach the stage where the exclusion of evidence is considered,
since the recognition of a new police power almost always presages the
failure of the accused’s Charter claim. Thus, section 24(2) simply does
not play a meaningful role in this analysis in police powers cases. It
should also be noted that section 24(2) cannot serve as a meaningful
82
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substitute for section 1 in cases where the section 1 analysis is functionally unavailable because section 1 and section 24(2) serve different
functions. The concerns that animate the section 1 inquiry are primarily
related to the costs associated with limiting Charter rights in a particular
case. The section 24(2) analysis, on the other hand, is concerned with the
“long-term repute of the justice system”.86

V. CONCLUSION
In this paper I have argued that in ancillary powers cases, the Supreme Court appears to have relocated the section 1 justification analysis
to the stage of determining whether the police were acting within the
scope of their common law police powers when they detained and/or
arrested an accused. I have suggested that one possible explanation for
this state of affairs is the functional unavailability of the section 1
analysis in cases where the police have violated Charter rights without
prior legislative or common law authorization.
It is clear that the ancillary doctrine incorporates a similar requirement of justification as section 1, meaning that police powers will be
crafted in a manner that satisfies a standard of proportionality. But this
departure from the standard mode of Charter analysis still raises concerns, for the reasons I have explained in this paper. There are many
reasons why courts ought not to be engaged in the incremental expansion
of police powers, the principal one being that it casts courts in the role of
facilitating the progressive erosion of Charter rights.87 Rights are far
weightier than the common law interpretative tools that courts have
imagined them to be in the police powers context. This fact has been
obscured by the ancillary powers doctrine that has developed in Canada
since Dedman. When Charter rights are but one among many competing
interests to consider in fashioning common law rules, the evidence
suggests that individual rights are sacrificed. For all these reasons, then,
courts should be reluctant to continue expanding police powers under the
ancillary powers doctrine.
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